Organization scholars have highlighted the value of relationships in fostering effective exchange, yet the empirical evidence supporting such claims remains largely indirect. We directly measure the value of ongoing relationships between suppliers and a large buyer, using the buyer's choices in internet-enabled reverse auctions to estimate the degree to which stronger relationships with suppliers increase its willingness to pay for standardized commodity parts. This setting permits us to focus more sharply on the anticipated benefits generated by pre-existing relationships, while minimizing the confounding influence on partner selection that social attachments associated with these relationships may generate. Our empirical analysis suggests that repeated interaction between firms leads to the formation of relational assets that share a number of properties with physical capital. We thus label these assets "relational capital." We find evidence that suggests that both social attachments and incentive considerations underpin the value of relational capital. Further, we find that relational capital exhibits more value in some settings than in others and that it exhibits diminishing marginal returns.
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INTRODUCTION
A market's virtue resides in its efficiency in matching sellers possessing heterogeneous capabilities and products to buyers possessing heterogeneous preferences. Markets prompt both buyer and seller to search broadly, eventually pairing sellers with those buyers who place the highest net value on the products, services, and capabilities of each seller. However, many exchanges demand more than an arms-length transfer of cash for easily-assessed goods and services. Many exchanges require transacting parties to transfer knowledge (Arrow 1974) , make co-specialized asset investments (Williamson 1985) , and generally adapt to changing and uncertain buyer needs. These more complex exchanges provide an abundant forum for selfserving behaviors that undermine effective exchange. In such settings, we commonly observe exchanges supported by long-term relationships that promote norms and social attachments (Granovetter 1985 , Gulati 1995a , Macneil 1978 , and also facilitate the development of stable inter-organizational routines (Dyer and Singh 1998) . These norms, social attachments, and interorganizational routines are embedded in no small part in the social interactions between individuals within the respective organizations. Continuity in an exchange deepens interorganizational ties and creates an expectation of future, repeated exchange that transacting parties must consider when determining present behavior. Relationship continuity thus promotes the formation of a relational asset that facilitates exchange and provides value to exchange partners.
Scholars have commonly assigned economic properties to this relational asset, labeling it capital, or more specifically social capital to represent its capacity to function as a "resource [s] that actors … use to pursue their interests …" (Baker 1990: 619) . However, scholars have actively questioned the appropriateness of both of these labels ("social" and "capital") , with 2 some suggesting non-social mechanisms through which relationship continuity may generate value (Bull 1987 , Parkhe 1993 , MacLeod 2007 , Gibbons 2009 ) and others questioning whether use of the economic term "capital" is appropriate or useful in describing these resources (Baron and Hannan 1994 , Arrow 1999 , Solow 1999 , Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000 . At issue is whether this relational asset possesses the economic properties of capital (Arrow 1999) or if instead social capital is a "bad analogy" (Solow 1999: 6) , meriting "abandonment" (Arrow 1999) . For "capital" to be an appropriate label requires demonstrating economic properties consistent with other common forms of capital (Fernandez et al. 2000 (Fernandez et al. : 1351 : a clear mechanism for measuring investment (Portes 1998:4) , a clear means of calculating returns (Arrow 1999 , Fernandez et al. 2000 , and a clear understanding of the degree to which this capital is "fungible across areas of activity" (Coleman 1988 : S102, Sobel 2002 , i.e., social capital should take on different value in different contexts. Additionally at issue is the degree to which relational assets function through social or non-social means.
In this paper, we present direct evidence of the economic properties of what we label "relational capital" 1 1 Kale, Perlmutter, and Singh (2000: 221) are the first to introduce the term "relational capital" which they describe as, "mutual trust, and respect, and friendship that reside at the individual level between alliance partners" developed through "a history of close relationships." rather than social capital-a distinction which reflects both our focus on dyadic exchange relationships and our agnostic position as to how socially-determined this form of capital is. As noted by Fernandez et al. (2000 Fernandez et al. ( : 1290 , few studies directly test for the economic properties of social capital (see as exceptions, Fernandez et al. 2000 and Ingram and Roberts 2000) , and to our knowledge none do so within the context of dyadic buyer-supplier relations. One reason for this void is that measuring the economic returns to relational capital requires navigating a significant empirical obstacle. While a buyer's assignment of value to relational capital can be derived from examining the buyer's choice among a menu of 3 alternatively priced exchange offers from suppliers with differing levels of relational capital, the buyer's choice among exchange offers is often shaped not only by relational capital's benefits to the buying firm, but also by the private benefits that accrue to individuals within the buying firm.
For instance, social attachments between a buyer's procurement agents and a supplier's sales representatives may cause the buyer to assign value to relational capital in excess of its true value to the firm-a result that causes buyers to not switch suppliers, generating the problem of "overembeddedness" or the "paradox of embeddedness" (Uzzi 1997: 35) . Thus, any effort to assess the economic value of relational capital must recognize the private benefits to exchange continuity and remove its "distorting" effect on the assignment of value.
We address this measurement challenge by examining a novel empirical setting in which the selection of exchange partners is de-socialized-internet-enabled reverse auctions for standardized industrial parts. In these reverse auctions, pre-qualified suppliers electronically submit competitive bids (e.g. prices) to supply well-specified parts, products, and services under pre-defined contractual terms. Once suppliers' bids are submitted, the buyer selects a particular supplier based on bid price, the magnitude of relational capital with that supplier, and other factors. The selection of a supplier obligates both buyer and supplier to exchange on the terms specified in the bid. Notably, through this process, search is systematized and partner selection is made more transparent to all in the organization. This process pushes the firm to focus on the functional benefits of exchanging with "friends" (i.e., the buyer's value from social capital) rather than on preferences for friends, independent of these functional benefits.
At a broad level, our contribution is empirical in demonstrating direct evidence of the dollar value of relational assets and inter-firm relationships. While prior studies have investigated the impact of historical relationships on partner choice (Levinthal and Fichman 1998 4 Gulati 1995a), on the design of inter-organizational agreements (e.g., Anand and Khanna 2000 , Gulati 1995b , Poppo and Zenger 2002 , and on the performance of inter-firm alliances (e.g., Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002 , Krishnan, Martin, and Noorderhaven 2006 , Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998 , Gulati and Nickerson 2008 , our paper examines directly the incremental willingness-to-pay associated with (deeper) relationships between buyers and suppliers. We present evidence that suggests that relationships do indeed generate value, even for the procurement of standardized, industrial parts. Deeper relationships generate more value, albeit with diminishing marginal returns. Initial additions to the exchange history of a buyer and seller generate considerable value for the buyer, while later additions to the exchange history generate little additional value. Further, we show that the value of relationships is situational, and depends, predictably, upon attributes of the exchange. We contend, thus, that the term relational "capital" is appropriate to describe these assets. Additionally, we observe that relational capital generates value more readily between buyer and supplier when the cost of developing interpersonal ties between the firms drops, and that it does so less readily when technological uncertainty limits the "shadow of the future." We interpret these findings, respectively, as suggesting that both social and incentive-based mechanisms underpin relational capital's value.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Returns to Relational Capital
An extensive literature highlights the fact that inter-organizational exchanges are frequently repeated transactions embedded in social relationships. Social relations promote norms of flexibility, extensive information exchange, and commitment to mutual problem solving, all of which facilitate the adaptation essential to sustained exchange (Uzzi 1997, Dyer 5 and Singh 1998, Poppo and Zenger 2002) . Repeated exchange also promotes personal attachments among individuals within these organizations (Dore 1983 , Gerlach 1992 ) and promotes what is often referenced as relational embeddedness (Granovetter 1992) . Trust also emerges through repeated exchange, as exchange partners accumulate a shared history. The resulting trust generates an expectation of future behavior that, as Bradach and Eccles (1989: 104) describe, "alleviates the fear that one's exchange partner will act opportunistically". While expectations are an individual cognitive perception, sociologists also reference organizational trust (Zucker 1986, Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998) , presumably a complex aggregation of these individual expectations. Other scholars note that repeated exchange generates commonly shared language and communication codes that facilitate efficient exchange (Monteverde 1995 , Arrow 1974 . A separate tradition, rooted in the theory of repeated games, suggests that these expectations of future cooperative behavior reflect the "shadow of the future" that emerges through repeated interaction (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982; Parkhe 1993; MacCleod 2007) , rather than social attachments. In its simplest form, this logic suggests that if the expected future benefits of continued cooperation outweigh the present benefits of behaving in a self-interested manner, then agents cooperate. Continuity in exchange simply affects expectations about others' likelihood of behaving opportunistically (i.e. "if it were profitable for my partner to misbehave, he should have done it by now") or may reduce the firm's estimate of the likelihood that exogenous factors will abruptly reduce the payoffs from cooperation. 2 2 Recently, nuanced arguments based on related thinking have been advanced. In one view, a common history provides a focal equilibrium for future cooperation. Chassang (2010: 448) , for example, shows that as common history grows, a less-well informed player learns to monitor its partner which "allows players to establish more efficient cooperative routines." In another view, managers over time develop potentially path-dependent "relational contracts" that enable the selection of better cooperative equilibria (Gibbons 2009, Gibbons and Henderson 2010). In summary, there is broad consensus across a wide range of literature that continued and repeated exchange generates 6 an asset that is "created and leveraged through relationships" (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998:244 
Relational Capital's Value in Context
While Coleman (1988:10) notes that social capital is potentially "appropriable" across a range of settings, if social capital functions like other forms of physical capital such as machinery, its value should vary by use (Adler and Kwon 2002) . Thus, unlike highly fungible financial assets, the value of physical assets, such as real estate or machinery, is highly context specific. We suspect that relational capital functions similarly in being more valuable in some 7 settings than in others. Implicit (or explicit) in much of the literature on inter-organizational relations is the principle that firms match the scope of relational capital or embeddedness to the attributes of an exchange or task (Uzzi 1997) . Existing empirical work is indirectly suggestive of this relationship. In particular, prior work demonstrates a link between the presence of complex or hazardous exchange and the use of governance forms that promote sustained exchange relations (Poppo and Zenger 1998 , Pisano, Russo, and Teece 1988 , Pisano 1989 , Gulati 1995a Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger 2004) . Our interest here is in exploring precisely how the returns to relational capital vary by exchange setting.
Relational Capital and Complexity. The complexity of a part or product may influence the costs associated with governing its procurement. The more complex the part or product, the more that can go wrong in its production and the more details that must be addressed in the process of contracting (Masten 1984) . With a complex part, small deviations from product specifications may render the parts unusable. Thus, precisely measuring and assessing quality may be essential to effective exchange. However, when products are complex, engaging in such measurement may be extremely costly (Barzel 1982) , and contracting along such dimensions even more costly.
Relational capital may be of particular value in these exchange contexts as it provides an important substitute for such measurement and contracting. In fact, in cases of high complexity, contractual enforcement may not be feasible, as courts may lack the necessary expertise to distinguish among competing arguments (Tirole 1999 Such investments enhance the capability of the supplier to satisfy the buyer's needs. These investments are typically made ex post, i.e. after an agreement to exchange. Because these investments have limited or no application when deployed in alternative uses, sellers (or buyers) fear that any returns they receive from investing in these assets will be appropriated by the buyer (or seller) (Williamson 1985, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978) . Consequently, both parties are reluctant to make investments in the absence of adequate safeguards (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978) . While vertical integration is a common remedy, relational capital offers an alternative governance remedy to support and safeguard these co-specialized and capabilityenhancing investments (Gulati 1995b , Jones, Hesterly, Borgatti 1997 . Expectations of continuity, reciprocity norms, and personal attachments provide suppliers with economic incentives to make these investments after agreeing to terms. Confidence in the expected longevity of the exchange provides the time horizon necessary to accumulate the return required to justify co-specialized investments. Similarly, common language or inter-organizational routines that emerge through repeated interaction may lower the costs of making and monitoring these investments (Dyer and Singh 1998, Monteverde 1995) . Consequently, when exchange requires co-specialization, buyers place particular value on suppliers with whom they possess relational capital. Thus, we hypothesize:
The value of relational capital in an exchange dyad will be higher when exchange requires co-specialized asset investments.
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Relational Capital and the Need for Adaptation. Adaptability is a key feature of successful buyer-supplier relationships (Williamson 1985) . One area in which adaptability is of great value is in the face of demand shocks. As buyers confront fluctuations in demand for their own products, these fluctuations are passed along to suppliers in the form of reduced or accelerated demand for suppliers' inputs. Such uncertainty precipitates a need for a supplier to adapt and elevates the value of relational capital. For instance, if demand for the exchanged product is highly uncertain and volatile, buyers will particularly value suppliers with incentives to adapt flexibly to both the peaks and valleys in demand. Relational capital with suppliers in these circumstances may provide buyers with confidence in the supplier's ability and incentives to adapt. Hence, we hypothesize: Expectations of Continuity and the Value of Relational Capital. As noted above, economicsbased arguments about the value of relationships suggest that relationships shape the "shadow of the future." In no small part, the choice between sustained long term cooperation and short term self-interested behavior depends on an agent's view of the time horizon for future exchange.
Technological uncertainty or turbulence, specifically shifts in suppliers' underlying production technology, may dramatically shift the capability of alternative existing suppliers as perceived by buyers (Afuah 2000 , Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000 , Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger 2008 Relational Capital as a Socially-Generated Asset. In the discussion above we have highlighted theories that address both social and non-social mechanisms through which relational capital generates value in exchanges. If relational capital shapes value through purely non-social mechanisms, then the value of relational capital, measured by prior exchange, should not vary with the ease (or difficulty) of forming social relations through exchange. On the contrary, if relational capital (or some portion thereof) is generated through social factors, then the value buyers assign to relational capital, as measured by prior exchange, should be greater when the cost of forming social relations is lower. Language barriers and physical distance between a buyer and seller should increase the costs of developing social relations. By contrast, sharing a common language and close physical proximity should increase the pace at which valuable relational capital accumulates through repeated exchange. Thus, we hypothesize: 
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DATA
Empirical Setting
As discussed in the introduction, the social relationships that partially underpin relational capital not only facilitate effective exchange dyads but may also deter optimal movements in these buyer and seller dyads (Blau 1964: 161) . In particular, if buying agents develop personal affinity toward members of the supplier's organization or otherwise gain private benefits from relationships with this supplier, then the selection of an exchange partner may reflect a combination of personal preferences and efficiency considerations. As a consequence, firms may address this distortion by developing processes of supplier selection that seek to correctly assign value to social connections in repeated exchange, while ignoring private gains that distort these assessments.
Online procurement auctions (or "reverse" auctions) have become a common mechanism through which firms seek to eliminate consideration of these private returns that may confound supplier selection. Today most large industrial firms use online procurement auctions to acquire significant portions of their inputs (Tunca and Wu 2008) . In a typical online reverse auction, a buyer specifies a particular product or service it seeks to procure, and then invites suppliers, often pre-qualified, to submit bids electronically to supply given quantities of these inputs.
Suppliers observe others' bids and, if they choose, submit progressively lower bids in response.
The common pattern is one in which bid prices rapidly fall immediately prior to the close of the bidding event. Once pre-qualification is complete, communication between the buyer and suppliers is limited largely to the electronically submitted bids. 12 We assembled data from the procurement operations of a large, global diversified manufacturing company with headquarters in the Mid-Western United States that uses online reverse auction extensively. We refer to this company as Buyco. Starting in 2000, Buyco emerged as one of the country's larger users of Internet-enabled reverse auctions. These auctions were explicitly adopted as a mechanism to reduce procurement costs, by both identifying new suppliers and extracting price reductions from existing suppliers with which Buyco had long established relationships. By 2006, a significant fraction of Buyco's total procurement spending for components and services was allocated through reverse auctions.
Parts that required very high degrees of customization, ongoing design integration, and cospecialization were unlikely to be procured via reverse auction. Thus, the sample we assemble represents exchanges that likely yield lower returns to relational capital. Buyco invested heavily in staff and systems to support the use of reverse auctions across its businesses, creating a department in the corporate office devoted to training division managers in how to organize reverse auctions, sharing best practices in procurement across the organization, and qualifying potential suppliers. A procurement auction, or competitive bid event (CBE), as Buyco labeled them, began by identifying bundles of items that Buyco believed could be efficiently supplied by a single supplier. A given CBE could include a single bundle of such products or could include several bundles. Buyco typically restricted the bundles in a CBE to a single narrowly-defined commodity category, e.g., plastic parts, stamped parts, fasteners, etc. Once a common bundle or set of bundles was identified, Buyco scheduled a CBE. These competitive bid events were not strictly reverse auctions, because the lowest bidder was not automatically awarded the business.
Rather, Buyco used the event to solicit bids from invited suppliers.
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Buyco established the list of invited suppliers through a process of pre-qualification, restricting the bid events only to those firms assessed to have the capabilities to produce and deliver the items to be procured. The process of pre-qualifying suppliers was performed by a dedicated team of procurement professionals, who traveled extensively to evaluate suppliers. Limiting the bidding only to suppliers believed to be capable of fulfilling the contract was deemed to be important for the integrity of the auction. 14 with the supplier. 5 The selection process typically involved consultation between corporate procurement officers and divisional staff. In this process, the influence of private benefits or personal affinity on partner selection would generally be eliminated, as these justifications for maintaining relationship continuity were not deemed legitimate by the organization. Buyco used a third party application service provider to organize information about the CBE online and to conduct the auctions themselves.
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Construction of the Data Set
We selected CBEs performed during an 18 month period covering April 2005 to September 2006. To focus on economically important transactions, we limited our attention to bid events for which the prior historical spending exceeded $40,000 annually. Further, to reduce an undesirable source of heterogeneity, we focused only on items used directly in the manufacturing of final goods sold by Buyco. Thus, we eliminated from consideration auctions for services and indirect (overhead) expenses. This yielded an initial set of 242 CBEs representing procurement activity for 928 item bundles.
We compiled our data from several sources. We collected data on the identity of bidders and their bids from the application service provider; we collected data on awards and attributed of the prior relationships from Buyco; and we administered a supplemental survey to collect data on attributes of the items procured. We describe the collection of these data sets below.
Bidders, Bids, and Awards. We recorded information about the identity of each bidding supplier, the items to be procured, contract terms, and bid amounts converted into US dollars for completed CBEs. These data were manually extracted from web pages generated by the application service provider that managed Buyco's online auctions. 7 To ascertain the identity of the winning supplier, we matched the bid data with a management database provided to us by Buyco. 8 Additionally, using data from the auctioneer and from online searches, we identified the home country and location of each bidder and whether the bidder was a multinational firm. 9 We drop from our sample bids made by a handful of suppliers whose headquarters we are unable locate.
Measuring Relational Capital between Suppliers and Buyco.
We measure the stock of relational capital in an exchange dyad using measures of the exchange history between Buyco and each supplier. We focus on three distinct measures of exchange history: a dichotomous variable indicating whether any transactions had taken place between the supplier and Buyco in an interval of time prior to the CBE, the dollar value of sales from the supplier to Buyco during this interval, and a continuous variable that indicates the number of consecutive quarters in which the supplier and Buyco had an exchange relationship. Our implicit assumptions in choosing these proxies for relational capital are (a) that no relational capital can exist between firms that have no 7 A number of factors contributed to data attrition at this stage: in some cases links to the CBE in question were no longer available or the bid information contained in the links was incomplete. In a few cases the CBE failed because bids did not drop below a reservation price. In several cases only one bidder entered a bid, rendering a comparison of bidding firms irrelevant. We discarded these observations. Additionally, we discarded all bundles awarded to bidders whose prices were more than 100% above that of the lowest bidder. In these cases, we presumed that there was an error in the entry of bid amounts or that a bidder had entered a "protest" bid that they did not intend to honor.
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prior commercial relationship, (b) that more relational capital is likely to be generated between Buyco and suppliers with whom the commercial relationships are extensive than with those with whom the commercial relationship is limited, and (c) that more relational capital builds up between transacting parties over time. 10 To obtain these measures we employ a central database Characteristics of the Items to Be Procured. To measure attributes of the items in a CBE, we administered a questionnaire to procurement experts at Buyco. We pre-tested our questionnaire with a cross-functional team at Buyco including both engineers and procurement experts to ensure that our questions were well understood. We then obtained ratings from two procurement experts at Buyco. From our interviews with Buyco's procurement staff, we concluded that because common parts were clustered within a CBE, the heterogeneity in procured products was largely at the level of the CBE.
11 descriptions and drawings of the bundle of products within the CBE. Each expert then scored the products in each CBE along a dozen dimensions using a 7-point Likert scale. Using these survey data, we obtained several measures of exchange attributes including: complexity of the parts procured, asset specificity of production equipment, predictability in demand over time, and the rate of technological change in supplier technology.
12 Table A1 provides data on the survey items used in measuring each construct. Our experts' ratings were well correlated, yielding average reliability of between .67 and .90. To facilitate the analysis and interpretation of results below, we utilize as measures the z-scored average of the two experts' ratings.
Summary Statistics
In describing the data, we use the index i to denote the bidder, j to denote the item or bundle of items procured through a single auction, and m to denote the CBE. Multiple bidders i compete for each bundle j, and multiple bundles j, may be procured through a single CBE. Table   1 presents summary statistics. In all, 562 bundles in 189 CBEs are represented in the dataset.
The average number of bids per bundle is 5.73 (median 5). In the sample, 43.2 percent of the bundles were awarded to the lowest bidder. The average premium paid by Buyco over the lowest bid was 6.7 percent (median 0.5 percent). The median price rank of the winning bidder was 2 nd , and the median winning bid was $123,000. Bidders had, on average, sold roughly $31,000 to Buyco in the four quarters prior to the auction event; however, this figure is highly skewed, comprising 41.1% of bidders that had no prior relationship with Buyco and a handful who had yearly sales in excess of $10 million. Experienced bidders won 71.4% of the awards.
ANALYSIS
Estimating Returns to Relational Capital
To estimate returns to relational capital, we examine the value Buyco assigns to an accumulated unit of relational capital, as proxied by the measures discussed above. We estimate this valuation econometrically by analyzing Buyco's choice among alternative supplier bids for a given item. Our analysis assumes that for each item, Buyco chooses the supplier that maximizes its expected profits, as determined by bidder's price, the relational capital that exists between
Buyco and the bidder, and other factors which we discuss below. We employ a conditional logit specification in which we consider the auction of each bundle of items to be a distinct group.
For each bundle of items Buyco chooses a single supplier, whom it expects will maximize its profits at the offered price. Under this specification, we implicitly model the expected profits for
Buyco from supplier i for bundle j in CBE m as:
We use the log of the bid in US dollars as our price variable. This enables us to interpret results as percent differences in bids and avoids putting disproportionate weight on auctions for highvalue items. The variable RC im reflects the relational capital between supplier i and Buyco in the quarter preceding the event m. The vector SUP_CHARS i represents characteristics of the supplier, including its distance from Buyco's headquarters and whether the supplier is a multinational, and characteristics of the supplier's home country, in particular, the corruption perception index issued by Transparency International, and whether the supplier is headquartered in an English-speaking country. The vector, BIDSTRAT i(-j)m 13 13 To account for the possibility that Buyco may also value working with few suppliers, we control for the bidders' competitiveness in its bids for other items in the bid event, using total savings relative to the average bid in other auctions (denoted by -j) in the bid event m, as well as the number of other items on which the supplier bid in m. We , reflects the bidding of i for other 19 items in bid event m. The error term, ε ijm , represents factors that are unobservable to the analyst, which may include dynamic considerations such as Buyco's desire to increase competition in future auctions. The probability, then, that supplier i is awarded the contract is:
Throughout, we report robust standard errors clustered by CBE, to allow for the potential nonindependence of the choices of suppliers for items auctioned in a bid event.
14 We report the results of the conditional logit analysis in Table 2 . In column 1 we report the estimates using the control variables only. As expected, higher prices reduce a buyer's likelihood of winning a contract; this relationship is significant at p < .001 levels. We find that the coefficient estimate on the multinational indicator is small and not significantly different from zero. Since this variable should be a good proxy for supplier size and capability, we interpret this as indicating that the pre-qualification procedure indeed restricts the set of bidders to those with the capabilities to fulfill the contract, and that conditional on being allowed to bid, supplier scale is of limited importance to Buyco. Further, the estimates in column 1 show that Buyco is significantly less likely to choose a bidder that is more distant from its headquarters, and more likely, although not significantly, to choose a bidder from a country with lower perceived corruption. Additionally, when bidder i's bids for items other than j offer greater savings relative to the average bids on these other items in the CBE, this is associated with an include these variables to incorporate opportunities for economies of scope that Buyco may exploit. Suppose for example, that dealing with each supplier imposes a constant fixed cost. In this case, Buyco may pay a slightly higher price for a given item if they plan to award another item in the auction to the same supplier, relative to a bidder who has not priced competitively for other items in the same auction.
14 A common critique of the conditional logit specification is that it assumes independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In this setting, however, in which all suppliers are invited to bid, IIA less likely to be an undesirable assumption. Further, we perform tests suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984) that do not indicate that IIA is a poor assumption for this data.
20 increased probability that i will win item j; however, the number of other items i bids on in the CBE does not impact the probability of being awarded the supply contract for the item.
The remaining columns in Table 1 examine the role of relational capital in partner selection. Columns 2 through 4 employ dichotomous measures of relational capital, reflecting whether the bidding firms had a (significant) commercial relationship with Buyco in the four quarters prior to the bid event. The estimates of β are large, statistically significant, and vary little according to the sales volume cutoff. In columns 5 through 8, we employ continuous measures as proxies for social capital. In column 5, we employ the log of the total dollar value of prior sales in the two quarters preceding the CBE plus a constant; we add the constant to avoid losing observations that would be undefined if we took the log of 0. In columns 6 and 7 we extend the intervals to four and six quarters, respectively. In each case, estimates of β are again large, and statistically significant. These estimates suggest that Buyco values a one standard deviation increase (across the sample) in RC im a equivalently to an 8.2 to 8.4 percent decrease in price. In column 8, we use the log of the number of consecutive quarters in which bidder i and Buyco had a relationship, prior to the bid event. The resulting estimates are similar to those in columns 5 through 7: they indicate that Buyco values a one standard deviation increase in the length of the relationship equivalently to an 8.6 percent decrease in price.
The results in columns 2 through 8 establish that Buyco assigns a premium valuation to firms with which it possesses relational capital, but they do not in and of themselves establish that more relational capital generates more economic value. It is possible that the results merely reflect the difference between those with no relational capital and those with positive levels. To examine this we re-estimate the model, using only the bidders with whom Buyco had a prior relationship. In this analysis we identify β only from items for which two or more "experienced" 21 bidders participated. This reduces the number of bids under analysis to 1400, and the number of relevant items to 451. Columns 9 and 10 report the results of the estimation using the log of sales in the prior four quarters and the length of the relationship as measures of RC im , respectively. In both cases, the estimates for β are positive, significantly different from zero, and are close to the values of the prior estimates using the entire data set. The estimates in column 9 and 10 suggest that, when only experienced suppliers are considered, a one standard deviation increase in RC im is equivalent to a price decreases of 5.6 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively.
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Together, the results in Table 2 offer strong support for Hypotheses 1a: relational capital returns significant value in exchange. The estimates in Table 2 are also consistent with diminishing marginal returns to relational capital. In Table 3 we examine more directly whether relational capital exhibits diminishing marginal returns by allowing the coefficients on RC im to vary non-parametrically. In column 1 we break up the level of commercial interaction in the year preceding the auction into $500,000 increments and enter these category dummies into the conditional logit equation. The point estimates generate a distinct pattern. The value of prior experience peaks between $1.5 and $2 million, representing, respectively the 70 th and 75 th percentiles of the distribution among experienced bidders, declining slightly thereafter, although these differences are not significant. Given that rather smooth transitions between categories that we observe in the rest of the data, we suspect that this peak is an anomaly. A joint test of equality of the differences between these coefficients (i.e., [β
.01-.5M ) rejects at p = .0600, indicating that percentage increases in the value to Buyco of this measure of social capital with its supplier 15 The standard deviations of these measures when new suppliers are excluded are 2.21 and 0.71, respectively.
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are not constant as the measure increases. In column 2 we repeat this test using the length of the continuous relationship with the supplier as the measure of social capital. Here again, we see a distinct pattern in the point estimates. Moving from no experience to 1-4 quarters of interaction is associated with an increase in value to Buyco of .65; moving from 1-4 to 5-8 quarters is associated with an incremental benefit of .28, and moving from 5-8 quarters to 9 quarters + is associated with an incremental benefit of .05; however, in a test of joint equality, the coefficients on these dummies are not estimated precisely enough to reject he hypotheses that these increments are equal. Together, the results in columns 1 and 2 offer suggestive evidence that relational capital, as we measure it, exhibits diminishing marginal returns, supporting H1b.
Examining Relational Capital's Value in Context
To examine whether the expected value of relational capital varies systematically with the attributes of the exchange, we modify equation (1) to include interactions between relational capital and exchange attributes. We modify the equation as follows:
In this equation, the vector, CHARS m , reflects the measures of exchange attributes discussed in the section "Characteristics of the Items to Be Procured", and the remaining variables are identical to those in equation (1) above. We interpret the coefficients β 2 as the incremental value accruing to a unit of relational capital when the complexity, asset specificity, or other attribute measure of the item procured increases by one standard deviation. We use equation (3) to examine hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c, and H3, as tests of each of these hypotheses exploits variation in the underlying characteristics of the items being procured. 23 We report the results in Table 5 using discrete and continuous measures of relational capital, respectively. In each of these regressions, the estimated coefficients α and β 1 remain large and significantly different from zero. Furthermore, in each specification, coefficient on the interaction term between complexity and the relational capital measure, β 2 complexity , is positive, but only in the interaction with the discrete measure (column 1) is it significantly different from zero. Thus, the analysis supports, but only weakly, H2a, and we speculate that within the context of reverse auctioned parts (as opposed to parts sourced via long-term agreements) there may be insufficient variation to identify an effect. By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction between asset specificity and the measure of relational capital, β 2 asset_specificity , is positive and significantly different from zero across each of the specification. The magnitudes of β 2 asset_specificity vary from 41 to 65 percent of the size of β 1 , suggesting that moving from one standard deviation below the mean in asset specificity to one standard deviation above the mean roughly doubles the importance of relational capital. We interpret these results as providing strong support for H2b.
Finally, we observe that estimates for β 2 demand_variation are small and not significantly different from zero. These results do not support H2c. Relational Capital as a Socially-Generated Asset. The test of Hypothesis 3 above suggests that incentives are an important mechanism through which relational capital functions. We next look for evidence that relational capital may be socially generated. In particular, we examine whether the buyer accumulates relational capital with a supplier at a more rapid rate if the costs of building social connections between members of the organizations decline. We assume that the costs of developing social connections are higher the more distant the supplier is from Buyco headquarters. Additionally, because Buyco is a predominantly English-speaking company, we assume that it is more costly for Buyco to form relationships with firms located in non-Englishspeaking nations. To examine these possibilities, we modify equation (1) If relational capital functions only through incentive mechanisms-extending the shadow of the future or enabling firms to find a better cooperative equilibrium because of their common economic history-then 18 We include all countries in our sample in which English is an official language as well as the United States. These include the Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Ireland, India, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa. The results are robust to using several different subsets of this list including restricting it to the USA, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and Ireland.
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we would expect the value of incremental units of experience between Buyco and the supplier to be uniform across the sample and the coefficient on the interaction term to be zero. If, by contrast, social mechanisms generate (some of) the value of relational capital, then we would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive.
We present the results of this analysis in Table 5 . Columns 1 through 3 report a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term of interest for each of the measures of relational capital that we employ (p = .051, p= .023, and p = .080), providing support for H4a.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 each reports a positive coefficient on the interaction term of interest, but only the interaction with the continuous sales measure of RC im is significantly different from zero (p = .077). We interpret these results as supporting H4b weakly. Overall these estimates suggest that valuable relational capital accumulates as a function of experience about twice as fast with suppliers based in English speaking countries as with other suppliers, and similarly that it accrues about 50 percent faster for firms located 'close' to Buyco headquarters compared with those located far away. These results suggest that social mechanisms underpin at least some portion of the value of relational capital.
DISCUSSION
Our aim in this paper is to explore the economic properties of relational capital in a setting in which active efforts are underway to de-socialize the selection of an exchange partner.
The setting of de-socialized selection is important because it allows us to sidestep the "overembeddedness" problem that may distort efforts to measure empirically social capital's value in exchange. Finally, we offer some evidence consistent with the view that, at least in part, relational capital generates value through social, as opposed to purely incentive and information-based, mechanisms.
We find it noteworthy that, even in the procurement of commodity products through a desocialized process that focuses attention on minimizing supply costs, relational capital as measured by prior exchange history generates significant economic value for Buyco. Figure 1 uses the estimates in Table 2 column 6 to provide a graphical image of relational capital's return to the buyer. In this figure, we plot the degree to which relative price and relational capital interact to influence the probability that a supplier will win a contract. To generate this figure we assume a focal bidder is competing against four other suppliers each with the median level of relational capital who have submitted bids at the 0 th , 25 th , 50 th , and 75 th percentiles of the bid premium distribution. A potential supplier with high levels of relational capital may expect to win much more frequently than chance (i.e., one fifth of the time), even when requesting substantial premiums over the lowest bidder. Figure 1 also underscores the fundamental tension 27 faced by potential suppliers. Increasing relational capital increases both the probability of winning the contract at a given price and the potential premium for a fixed probability of success. However, to win the contract, and sustain the accumulation of relational capital, a potential supplier must initially be price competitive. This dynamic may be particularly important for buyers and suppliers to recognize because relational capital seems to exhibit diminishing marginal returns, absent which pressure to consolidate all business with a small handful of suppliers would mount.
We believe that the properties of relational capital that our analysis uncovers are also of significant interest. First, we find suggestive evidence that relational capital exhibits diminishing marginal returns, i.e., initial increments of experience with a supplier generate more value than subsequent increments. 19 Whether the initial establishment of relational capital is associated with generating valuable social connections, reducing the fear of opportunistic behavior, or extending the perceived shadow of the future remains a topic for future investigation. 20 Further, we find that when exchange requires asset specific equipment to generate the output required by the buyer, relational capital seems to be particularly valuable. We interpret this result as indicating that relational capital may increase the trust ex ante between Buyco and the supplier and thereby support the necessary investments in relationship-specific physical capital.
21 19 Recall that we measure relational capital between Buyco and bidders in the quarter prior to the CBE. We, thus, do not assume for example that relational capital builds up immediately.
The 20 The degree to which valuable social connections are generated in the initial stages of a relationship is, of course, partially under the control of the organizations in question. For example, firms may schedule introductory meetings and social events in order to foster these social connections.
21 A concern here may be that the asset specificity measure may pick up investments that have already been made by incumbent suppliers. Buyco may indeed prefer these suppliers, as they may then have few questions about whether the appropriate relationship specific investments will be made. The net effect on Buyco's decisions would be the same, however the mechanism and interpretation would be slightly different. Absent uncertainty about these co-specialized investments, we note, Buyco should be unwilling to pay more when relational capital is high, as prior investment in them are sunk. These sunk investments, however, could affect bidders' costs, which we do not analyze in this paper.
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presence of relational capital may simply minimize the ex post appropriation risk, similar to the findings of Kale, Perlmutter, and Singh (2000) . Finally, we find that Buyco's choices indicate that relational capital is considerably less valuable when the technology that underlies a part's production is changing rapidly; at 1.5 σ above the median for this measure, increases in relational capital do not generate incremental value for Buyco (and thus the pricing power of suppliers with relational capital is eliminated). In these cases, it seems, flexibility represents an important consideration, which negates the value of relational capital between organizations.
Finally, we are able to shed some light on the question of whether a history of repeated interaction between organizations generates value by affecting the parties' information and incentives or by the establishment of interpersonal connections and inter-organizational routines.
We fully acknowledge that a key limitation of our paper, which we discuss in greater detail below, is that we cannot tease apart the many individual mechanisms proposed in literature through which repeated interaction may generate value for organizations. Our analysis, can, however demonstrate that in this context, it is unlikely that purely incentive and informationbased factors generate the value of relational capital. Rather, shared language and closer proximity between buyer and seller appear to generate more value in exchange, consistent with the hypothesis that social relationships are important in generating relational capital. Of course, the importance of social relationships in generating relational capital also highlights the potential value in desocializing the partner selection process, thereby circumventing the potentially distorting impact of individuals' private benefits.
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Limitations
Our study is, of course, not without limitations. Three concerns are paramount. First, our data are all drawn from a single industrial manufacturer. This enables extensive and detailed empirical testing, but limits the generalizability of our empirical results. Our point estimates about the rate at which Buyco is willing to trade off price for relational capital, for example, are unlikely to extend to more complicated goods or services.
Second, our proxies for relational capital generate some challenges in interpretation. As we cannot observe relational capital directly, we construct proxies based on a history if inter-firm interaction.
22 22 Researchers examining the returns to intangible assets (Lev 2001) or inventive activity (Pakes 1985) similarly have been forced to use available measures to proxy for underlying assets.
An advantage of our measures is that they are objective, verifiable, and do not rely on self-reported perceptions of goodwill or trust between organizations, which among other concerns may suffer from retrospective bias. A disadvantage of these measures, however, is that they do not allow us to pick apart which of several hypothesized theoretical mechanisms are generating the benefits of relational capital. According to discussions with managers at Buyco, our measures of relational capital correlate well with other measures of connectedness between organizations, such as the number of interpersonal ties and the frequency of interactions, and thus are likely to correlate well with dyadic conceptions of social capital. However, a long history of interactions is also frequently associated with a number of other relational mechanisms that have been hypothesized to improve the performance of inter-firm collaborations, but which might not be considered social capital. Dyer and Singh (1998) identify a number of mechanisms which may develop over time through repeated interaction, including the development of problem solving routines and the introduction of dedicated human capital to manage the relationship. Longer, more extensive commercial interactions may result in higher levels of trust 30 that may support cooperation and alter perceptions of potentially opportunistic behavior (Parkhe 1993 ) and may generate expectations about relationship continuity that can lead actors to be more likely to select cooperative equilibria (Gibbons 2006) .
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A final concern is that-because prior relationships with bidders have not been randomly assigned-unobserved characteristics of potential suppliers may correlate both with our measures of relational capital and the propensity of Buyco to select the supplier. While this is a valid concern, we believe it to be minimized in this setting for a number of reasons. First, because suppliers are pre-qualified to participate in the auctions (only suppliers deemed sufficiently capable are allowed to bid), we presume that meaningful differences in capability, if they exist, are modest. Second, the setting is one in which quality is easily observable, objective, and potentially verifiable in court. The products we examine are well specified: the design of each part has been finalized prior to the bid event and detailed technical drawings are available for each piece. This makes pre-qualification a "tight screen."
We acknowledge that relational capital may be formed by a complex amalgam of these mechanisms, social and non-social, and view our paper as a first step in demonstrating its measurable value and properties. While it is desirable to unpack the mechanisms through which relational capital operates, and the value generated by each, we see this as the objective of future work. The analysis we present in Tables   4 and 5 (H3 and H4a,b) represents a first step in this direction.
24 23 Gibbons (2006) is focused on interactions that take place within a firm, but could equally well describe activities between firms.
Moreover, the parts that are sourced are unbranded commodity parts for which final customers will not be willing to pay a premium. Third, the empirics do not support the view that capability differences between bidders are driving the results. If major capability differences remained following pre-31 qualification, we would expect the multinational variable-which should correlate highly with capability and reputation (Grant 1982 , Caves 2007 )-to be large, positive, and statistically significant. We find no such pattern in the data: the coefficients on this variable are small and do not reach statistical significance at the p < .1 level in any of our specifications, including when our measures of relational capital are omitted. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that unobserved heterogeneity is driving our results.
We undertake a set of additional robustness checks that provide us additional confidence that omitted variable bias, if present, is slight. Two-stage instrumental variable procedures to estimate non-linear models, especially those with interaction terms, do not produce consistent coefficient estimates (Hausman 2001) . We instead focus on a simpler, consistent model:
estimating the premium that Buyco pays above the lowest bid as a function of the winning bidder's characteristics (including its relational capital), others' relational capital, and other characteristics of the auction and the item. The dependent variable in this model is the percent difference between the winning bidder's bid and the lowest bid for the item.
We explore the potential endogeneity problem by using instrumental variables for the winning bidder's relational capital. These instruments should be correlated with the bidder's relational capital but not with other factors that might affect the price Buyco is willing to pay.
The instruments we employ are the log of the gross trade between the USA and the bidder's home country in 2002 in USD 25 25 We assume that this value for US-based suppliers is twice that of the US's largest trading partner.
, Transparency International's corruption perception index in 2002, and an interaction between these terms. The greater the trade between the two countries historically and the more stable the regime, the more likely Buyco would have been to search for suppliers in this particular country in the past, generating a relationship. Additionally we employ the log of other bidder's sales to Buyco in the first half of 2003, which should be related to the 32 likelihood that the auction is for an item for which relational capital is valued, but should also not affect price. Finally, we employ the length of the buyer's name in Buyco's database. Buyco employees are more likely to cut corners when entering new firms into the database; those with whom they have been doing business for a long time can be carried over via cut-and-paste.
Again, this variable will correlate with relational capital, but should be unrelated to the price premium. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis using a tobit specification to account for the fact that Buyco selects the lowest bidder 43 percent of the time. We continue to use robust standard errors, clustered on the bid event, to allow for non-independence of shocks within a bid event. If an omitted variable, such as unobserved differences in quality, were driving both relational capital and price, then we would expect the coefficients on relational capital to fall in the instrumental variable analysis and, potentially, to become insignificant. On the contrary, we do not find that this is the case. The coefficients on relational capital do not drop when instrumental variables are introduced (see columns 2 and 4). Despite substantially larger standard errors, these coefficients remain statistically significant. The instrumental variables yield first-stage R 2 of .26 and .28, respectively, and a generalized Hausman test, which accounts for clustering, yields test statistics of .1643 and .4208 in comparing the IV estimates to the noninstrumented tobit estimates. While these tests do not rule out endogeneity definitively, the evidence suggests that the rigorous pre-qualification of suppliers limits the impact of potential endogeneity in this analysis.
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CONCLUSION
We have sought to demonstrate that repeated interaction between firms generates relational assets that yield value for future exchange relationships. We directly measure the degree to which these relational assets increase a buyer's willingness to pay, and show that these assets share properties with physical capital: they can be measured (if only indirectly), they generate value, they are predictably more valuable in some settings than in others, and they exhibit diminishing marginal returns. We thus contend that relational capital is an appropriate label for these assets.
Additionally, we show that the value of relational capital is undermined in environments in which rapid technological change limits the degree to which parties expect exchange to be ongoing. This suggests that one mechanism through which relational capital functions is through affecting expectations about the shadow of the future. Absent turbulence in buyer-supplier relations caused by technological uncertainty, a prior history of interaction may shape partners' expectations about the likelihood that the relationship will break up. This may occur because of anchoring (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) , a reduction in information asymmetries about the partners' motivations, or because parties recognize that social attachments limit the degree to which firms will search of optimal exchange partners, a phenomenon which Uzzi (1997) labels "overembeddedness."
Further, we show that the value associated with a given relationship is greater when partners share a common language and provide some evidence that the same can be said when the geographic distance between partners is modest. That is, relationships generate value "faster" when the cost of generating social attachments is lower. This evidence suggests that social factors are likely to be important sources of the value of relational capital. An alternative 34 explanation-that high levels of relational capital are associated with greater investment in technological integration between the firms-is possible, but does not offer a direct explanation for why language should be an important moderating factor.
Although our theoretical discussion and our empirical analysis attempt to treat social and non-social factors as distinct in generating the value of relational capital, in practice these factors may be deeply intertwined. The formation of socially-based relational assets between members of exchanging firms is likely to be influenced by each firms' expectations about the potential continuity of exchange. Firms may also make conscious attempts to build these relational assets, by fostering site visits, taking clients to dinner, inviting suppliers to sporting events, etc. These investments both result from and shape expectations of exchange continuity. Moreover, nonsocial mechanisms are not executed by automatons, but rather by managers who naturally form social connections. A promising area for future research is developing a better understaning of the interactions between social and non-social factors that generate relational capital.
Finally, although our results suggest relational capital has economic properties consistent with other forms of capital, relational capital does differ from other forms of capital in one important dimension. Relational capital is jointly owned and as a consequence, the resulting returns are subject to a process of bargaining. The issue of shared ownership distinguishes this asset from other related concepts such as reputation. While reputation also addresses exchange hazards and generates value, reputations are individually owned, and differences in reputation with respect to competitors should be fully appropriable. Relational capital, by contrast, is jointly owned, and it has no value outside the relationship. As such, we anticipate buyers and suppliers bargain over the rents stemming from this relationship, with a number of interesting dynamics resulting. We view these dynamics as providing fertile ground for future research. .1457 *** significant at p < .01; ** significant at p < .05 * significant at p < .1 Note: Regressions additionally include the following unreported variables: an indicator variable if the firm is a multinational, an indicator variable if the firm is headquartered in an English-speaking country, the log of the distance from Buyco HQ to the bidder's headquarters, a corruption index for the buyer's home country, and variables indicating the number of other items the firm bid on in the CBE and the total savings relative to the median bid reflected in the supplier's other bids in the CBE. Robust standard errors, clustered on bid event in parentheses. .1738 .1684 *** significant at p < .01; ** significant at p < .05; * significant at p < .1 (two-sided test) Note: Regressions additionally include the following unreported variables: an indicator variable if the firm is a multinational, an indicator variable if the firm is headquartered in an English-speaking country, the log of the distance from Buyco HQ to the bidder's headquarters, a corruption index for the buyer's home country, and variables indicating the number of other items the firm bid on in the CBE and the total savings relative to the median bid reflected in the supplier's other bids in the CBE. Robust standard errors, clustered on bid event in parentheses.
-43 - .1493 *** significant at p < .01; ** significant at p < .05 * significant at p < .1 Note: Regressions additionally include the following unreported variables: an indicator variable if the firm is a multinational, an indicator variable if the firm is headquartered in an English-speaking country, the log of the distance from Buyco HQ to the bidder's headquarters, a corruption index for the buyer's home country, and variables indicating the number of other items the firm bid on in the CBE and the total savings relative to the median bid reflected in the supplier's other bids in the CBE. Robust standard errors, clustered on bid event in parentheses.
-44 - Table 6 . Summary of hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis Table 2  Table 3  Table 4  Table 5 H1a .2568 --.2771 *** significant at p < .01; ** significant at p < .05; * significant at p < .1 Note: The dependent variable is the percent difference between the winning bidder's bid and the lowest bidder's bid for the item in the auction. The following variables were used as instruments for relational capital: the gross level of trade between the bidder's home country and the USA in 2002, measured in USD; Transparency International's corruption perception index in 2002; an interaction between the trade and corruption measures; the number of characters of the bidder's name in the application service provider database; and control variables listed above. Robust standard errors, clustered on bid event are in parentheses. To provide these parts, the awarded supplier will need (or has already made, if the incumbent supplier) to make substantial investments in tooling and equipment that are specific to Buyco.
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.75
Demand Variation There can be a high level of variance month-to-month or season-to-season from the forecast demand for these parts 7 .67
Technological Change
The underlying technology required to manufacture these products has changed rapidly over the past five years 6 .77
Complexity (α = .88) 1: These represent complex parts that are difficult to manufacture 2: There is extensive, specialized skill, knowledge, and experience required to generate these parts 3: Very small variations from production specs render these parts completely unusable 7 7
7
.90 *Answers were on a seven point Likert scale, so the maximum summed response is 14.
